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SUPPLEMENTAL 
This appeal is about whether a County's issuance a tax deed for a parcel ofreal property 
in Idaho wipes out all vested easements on the property pursuant to Idaho Code section 63-1009, 
including prescriptive easements. Appellants Brent and Moura Regan ("Regan") claim the 
issuance of a tax deed does not eliminate prior vested easements. Respondents Jeff and Karen 
Owen ("Owen") argue the language of the statute sho\vs the issuance of a tax deed to a County 
disposes of prior "encumbrances," which Owens argue and in which contention the trial court 
agreed includes easements. Regan's timely filed March, 2016 Appellant's Brief provides lengthier 
exposition on the facts of this case. 
In its opinion filed October 9, 2015, the trial court in this case held favor of Owens that 
pursuant to Idaho Code 63-1009 vested easements are eliminated by a tax deed conveyance of the 
sen1ient estate, and thus that the Tax Deed to Orphan Parcel eliminated Regans' claim to a 
prescriptive easement across that Orphan Parcel. C.R. 69-77. The trial court entered a final 
judgment on October 30, 2015, and this appeal followed. C.R. 78-80. 
The narrow issue argued in this Supplemental Brief is whether wholly, or to some pai--tial 
extent the Idaho Legislature's passage and the Governor's signing of Senate Bill number 1388 on 
March 30, 2016 applies retroactively to the issues on appeal. Regans argue it does not so apply, 
but that this Court may account for the legislature's intent in reaching a decision. 
B) Course of the Proceedings on Appeal Regarding the Narrow Issue Presented. 
On December 10, 2014, the district court entered a partial judgment certified as final under 
Rule 54(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (I.R.C.P.). Clerk's Record on Limited Appeal 
18. Owen appealed, and on December 18, 2014, this Court filed opinion. Regan v. Jeff 
1 V. 
on 
easement over 
On August 2015, Owens' filed their third motion for summary judgment focusing on the 
prescriptive easement issue. C.R. 34. In its opinion filed October 9, 2015, the trial court ruled in 
Owens' favor that the Tax Deed to the Orphan Parcel eliminated Regans' claim to a prescriptive 
easement. C.R. 69-77. The trial court entered a final judgment on October 30, 2015. C.R. 78-80. 
On December 10, 2015, Regans filed a Notice of Appeal from the trial court's judgment. 
C.R. 81-85. On January 27, 2016, Regans filed an amended Notice of Appeal from the trial court's 
December 17, 2015 amended final judgment. C.R. 90-94. 
This Supplemental Brief is filed by Regan in response to this Court's denial on May 23, 
2016 of the parties' Stipulation on Appeal for Entry of an Order. Ord. Ref. No. 16-200 (May 23, 
2016). The Order denying the Stipulation provided 35 days for this Supplemental Brief to be filed, 
which date was calculated to be Monday, June 27, 2016. Id. Pursuant to the second sentence of 
Idaho Appellate Rule 20, this Supplemental Brief is certified to be timely filed. 
C) Statement of Facts 
The Court is aware of the facts of this case, but a brief iteration of select facts related to the 
narrow issue addressed in this Supplemental Brief is provided here. Regans o\vn a 50.55-acre 
parcel in Kootenai County. C.R. 25. Abutting their parcel to the east is a 10.7-acre parcel owned 
by Owens. C.R. 25. Owens acquired their property through two separate conveyances. They 
acquired a 10.3-acre parcel from David and Helen Hanna by the \Varranty Deed recorded in 
Kootenai County as Instrument No. 1781225 on February 11, 2003 (the "Owen Parcel"). C.R. 25. 
Later, Owens acquired a 0.4-acre parcel from Kootenai County by tax deed recorded in Kootenai 
2 
on 28, the 
was inadvertently created when the Original Grantors of these various lands deeded to the 
Marchelli Trust in April 1999. A.R. 464. The Original Grantors never conveyed the Orphan Parcel, 
and thus did not reserve an easement across it ( as they did when conveying the other parcels). 
An existing gravel roadway extends west from the corner of Bonnell Road to the Regans' 
property. The roadway passes through the Orphan Parcel using much of its area. A.R. 275; 283-
85. The roadway existed when Regans purchased the property from the Marchelli Trust in March 
of 1999, being used since that time by Regans. A.R. 280. 
The Original Grantors did not pay the real property taxes assessed against the Orphan 
Parcel. As a result, in 2004 the Kootenai County Treasurer issued a tax deed conveying the Orphan 
Parcel to Kootenai County (the "Tax Deed"). R. 67-68. Respondent Jeff Owen purchased the 
Orphan Parcel from Kootenai County by a County Deed recorded Kootenai County as 
Instrument No. 1997638 on November 28, 2005. R. 69-70. Jeff Owen then deeded the Orphan 
Parcel to Jeff D. Owen and Karen A. Owen, husband and wife, using a \Varranty Deed recorded 
in Kootenai County as Instrument No. 2294085000 on December 9, 2010. A.R. 409-10. 
STAil\1DARD OF REVIEW 
The narrow issue addressed by this Supplemental Brief raises both statutory interpretation 
and constitutional issues. The CDA Dai1y Queen, Inc. case provides the standard of review: 
'Both constitutional questions and questions of statutory interpretation are 
questions of law over which [the Idaho State Supreme] Court exercises free 
review.' Stuart v. State, 149 Idaho 35, 40,232 P.3d 813, 818 (2010); citing 
Federated Publ'ns, Inc v. Idaho Bus. Rev., Inc., 146 Idaho 207,210, 192 
P .3d 1031, 1034 (2008). 'The party challenging a statute or ordinance on 
constitutional grounds bears the burden of establishing that the statute or 
ordinance is unconstitutional and must overcome a strong presumption of 
3 
CDA Dairy Queen, Inc. v. State Ins. Fund, 154 Idaho 379,382,299 P.3d 186, 189 (2013). 
ISSUE PRESENTED IN THIS SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
Whether Senate Bill number 1388, as amended, which was passed in 2016 by the Sixty-
Third Idaho Legislature in its Second Regular Session and signed by Governor Otter on March 30, 
2016 applies retroactively to the issues on appeal here, and, if not, what "effect the legislation has 
as to this case." Ord. Denying Stip. For Entry of an Order Ref. No. 16-200 (May 16, 2016). 
ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
Senate Bill 1388, as amended, was signed into law by Governor Otter on March 30, 
2016. 2016 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 273 at 750, eff. Mar. 30, 2016. To facilitate ease ofreading in 
this Supplemental Briefs text, but not citations, Regan refers hereinafter to that enacted Act 
as Senate Bill 1388. That ten (10) page Senate Bill as enacted is attached to this Supplemental 
Brief as Exhibit A. 
Regan's argument will examine the specific language of Senate Bill 1388 as enacted to 
determine whether the legislature meant it to be applied retroactively, then why pursuant to 
Idaho law and regardless of legislative intent Senate Bill 1388 cannot be applied retroactively, 
and thus why this Court does not have to consider any retroactive effect of Senate Bill 1388 on 
this case, except as this Court finds that Senate Bill may help this Court interpret Idaho Code 
section 63-1009 to reach a final ruling. 
4 
15 2 17,254 1210, 12 3 11 
Intermountain Hosp., Inc. v. Ada Cnty., 150 Idaho 93, 95,244 P.3d 237,239 (2010). such an 
undertaking, which is not argued to differ from the interpretation of enacted session laws: 
The statute is viewed as a whole, and the analysis begins with the 
language of the statute, which is given its plain, usual and ordinary 
meaning. In determining the ordinary meaning of the statute, effect must 
be given to all the words of the statute if possible, so that none will be 
void, superfluous, or redundant. However, if the language of the statute is 
capable of more than one reasonable construction it is ambiguous, and a 
statute that is ambiguous must be construed with legislative intent in mind, 
which is ascertained by examining not only the literal words of the statute, 
but the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, the policy behind 
the statute, and its legislative history. 
(Citations omitted). 
Senate Bill 1388's Section 1 provides, in pertinent part, the legislature's intent and policy 
behind the statute: 
It is the intent of the Legislature to clarify the scope and effect ofldaho's 
statutes governing tax deeds .... It was never the intent of the Legislature 
to allow local governments to destroy valid property interests held by third 
parties in land that is subject to a sale or other conveyance based on a tax 
delinquency, except where notice and opportunity to cure is provided 
under the statute. Doing so would constitute an uncompensated taking of 
property under both the Idaho Constitution and the United States 
Constitution. The Legislature would never have intended such a result and, 
by this legislation, makes that clear. As its context should have made 
evident, the purpose of Section 63-1009, Idaho Code, and the other 
referenced sections, has always been to convey title absolutely free and 
clear ofliens and mortgages of a monetary nature. It was never the intent 
of the Legislature to allow a local governmental entity to convey more 
than the delinquent taxpayer owned and thereby to destroy valid property 
interests held by others without notice and an opportunity to cure. This 
clarification brings the interpretation of Idaho's tax deed statute into line 
with the interpretation of similar statutes in other jurisdictions, as had 
always been the Legislature's intent 
5 
6 § 1 at 1; see at 1. The was 
statutes 
tax states to 
absolutely free and clear of liens and mortgages of a monetary nature." Id. (Emphasis added.) 
The italicized language in the previous sentence is in the nature of clarifying language, i.e., 
"what I meant to say was," and not language indicating an intent to have a retroactive effect on 
previous tax deed conveyance transactions. 
a 
In Idaho, "a retroactive statute is one that changes the legal effect of previous transactions 
or events." Stuartv. State, 149 Idaho 35, 43,232 P.3d 813,821 (2010); citing Engen v. James, 
92 Idaho 690,695,448 P.2d 977, 982 (1969). "The inhibitions of the state and federal 
constitutions with regard to impairing the obligations of contracts extend to contracts made by a 
state or municipal corporation." Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Bashor, 36 Idaho 818, 819, 
214 P. 209,210 (1923); citing Fidelity State Bk v. North ForkH Dist., 35 Idaho 797,209 P. 449 
(1922). Further, and disagreeing with the District Court's ruling in this case, Senate Bill 1388 
makes it clear "[i]t was never the intent of the Legislature to allow a local governmental entity to 
convey more than the delinquent taxpayer owned and thereby to destroy valid property interests 
held by others without notice and an opportunity to cure." Id. at 750-51 ( emphasis added). 
The language of Section 1 avers merely to clarify the permanent intent of the legislature, such 
intent being confirmed to extend back to the original dates of the tax deed conveyance statutes. 
Support for this legislative contention is in Idaho's Session Laws of 1911, when statutes 
governing the process of redemption by a delinquent taxpayer prior to the conveyance and sale 
by a local governmental entity were amended. Those Session Laws amended Idaho Code section 
1773, and part of its language after amendment stated, "Upon the payment of the money 
specified ... , and the giving of the deed aforesaid by the treasurer, any deed or certificate of sale 
6 
interest 
911- 9 1911 0 at re: § 
(1911), This accords with Senate Bill 1388's Section I language where it states, "[i]t was never 
the intent of the Legislature to allow a local governmental entity to convey more than the 
delinquent taxpayer owned," because since at least 1911 what a county owned upon seizing a 
property for taxes was never more than "all right, title, and interest acquired by the county under 
or by virtue of the tax sale .... " LC. § 1773 (1911). Because a delinquent taxpayer could not 
own property interests in his land belonging to others, such as easements appurtenant, a county 
would never acquire such property interests belonging to others when it seized the delinquent 
taxpayer's property for nonpayment. I. C. § 55-101 (3) ( definition of real property includes "that 
which is appurtenant to land"). Therefore, when the 2016 legislature stated it never intended the 
seizure of real property to pay delinquent taxes "to destroy valid property interests held by 
others," that contention has support in the Idaho Code as amended in 1911. 2016 Idaho Sess. 
Laws, ch. 273 § lat 750-51; see Exhibit A at 1. This accords with the legislature's 2016 
contention that "the purpose of Section 63-1009, Idaho Code, ... has always been to convey title 
absolutely free and clear ofliens and mortgages of a monetary nature," and not to "destroy valid 
property interests held by others." Id. (Emphasis added). 
Therefore, at least regarding the Section 1 language of Senate Bill 13 88, the resulting 
statutory amendments should not be construed to be retroactive to affect past transactions. Stuart, 
149 Idaho at 43,232 P.3d at 821. However, neither the legislature's disclaimers nor claims in 
Section 1 satisfy the inquiry, and retroactivity may still be the effect of the 2016 law. 
Section 8 of Senate Bill 13 8 8 as enacted states: 
7 
emergency existing therefor, 
exist, this act shall full 
legislation. In any event, the ~~,~.u.,~, 
amendments shall be interpreted to apply to any and all conveyances by 
tax deed, past or future. 
2016 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 273 § 8 at 758; see Exhibit at 10. 
The first sentence is a common emergency clause allowed by both the Idaho Constitution 
and Idaho statutes. Idaho Const. Art. III § 22 ("No act shall take effect ... , except in case of 
emergency, which emergency shall be declared in the preamble or in the body of the law"); LC. 
§ 67-510 ("No act shall take effect ... , except in case of emergency, which emergency shall be 
declared in the preamble or body of the law.") The legislature certainly has this "decision-
making function that is uniquely legislative." Idaho State AFL-CIO v. Leroy, 110 Idaho 691, 
695, 718 P.2d 1129, 1133 (1986). Regans argue this sentence does not affect the issue of 
retroactivity, because with it the law is only full force and effect on and after its passage and 
approval." 2016 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 273 § 8 at 758; see Exhibit A at 10. The first sentence 
does not trigger retroactive application of the amended statutes. 
The second sentence of Senate Bill 1388's Section 8 disclaims retroactivity and gives the 
legislature's opinion: "Being a clarification of existing law, the Legislature does not view the 
application of this amendment to prior conveyances as retroactive legislation." Id. This sentence 
appears to be another way of the legislature stating, "what actually happened in those prior 
conveyances was what we declare here by our clarification to be what happened, and not what the 
Court apparently believed we meant when it gave its guidance to the District Court in the case of 
Regan v. Owen in 2014." Pursuant to this Court's definition, "a retroactive statute is one that 
changes the legal effect of previous transactions or events." Stuart, 149 Idaho at 232 P.3d at 
821. Idaho Code section 73-101 provides, "[n]o part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless 
8 
so 
,, 
sentence an 
same sentence 
If the statute is not retroactive, how can it apply to prior conveyances? 
Senate Bill 1388 amended several statutes, including the Idaho Code section 63-1009 at 
issue here on appeal. 2016 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 273 § 7 at 758; see Exl1ibit A at 10. "With 
amendments to statutes, this Court has stated that they will not be deemed retroactive in application 
absent an express legislative statement to the contrary." Guzman v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 938, 
318 P.3d 918, 928 (2014); citing Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft C01p., 113 Idaho 609, 614, 747 P.2d 
18, 23 (1987). In this case, the legislature does not desire to change the contractual tenns of prior 
conveyances made by tax deeds, but would simply like to clarify that the property conveyed by a 
local government entity to a third-party using a tax deed could only include the property that entity 
was able to previously seize from the delinquent taxpayer. It is m1lc11own whether any purchaser at 
a tax sale ever believed a conveying local government entity could sell property it did not own, 
and Regan finds no Idaho case law on that point. 
"It is the long standing rule in this [S]tate that when the legislature amends a statute it is 
deemed, absent an express indication to the contrmy, to be indicative of changed legislative 
intent." Nebeker, 113 Idaho at 614, 747 P.2d at 23 (emphasis added); see also, Lincoln Cnty. v. 
Fid. & Deposit Co. of Mmyland, 102 Idaho 489,491,632 P.2d 678, 680 (1981) ("'When a statute 
is amended, it is presumed that the legislature intended it to have a meaning different from that 
accorded to it before the amendment.") Certainly changed legislative intent would be found if the 
legislature expressly commanded its amendments be applied retroactively. However, in this case 
the legislature appears to expressly disclaim an intent to trigger retroactivity while expressly 
9 
intent \Vas to clarify law to 
6 
can 
13 88 to clarify various statutes by amending them, because Section 1 of that Senate Bill states, "It 
is the intent of the Legislature to clarify the scope and effect of Idaho's statutes governing tax 
deeds." 2016 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 273 § 1 at 750, see Ex. A, p. 1. Thus, in the first sentence of 
Section 1 and the second sentence of Section 8, here the latter found at Exhibit A, p. 10, the 
legislature declares its intent to merely clarify the law, and not to have retroactive effect so as to 
"change[] the legal effect of previous transactions or events." Stuart, 149 Idaho at 43,232 P.3d at 
821 (defining retroactivity). Therefore, Senate Bill 1388 should not be found by this Court to be 
retroactive pursuant to reasonable interpretation of the first two sentences of its Section 8, however 
the third sentence remains to be analyzed. 
The third sentence of Senate Bill 1388's Section 8 states, "fa any event, the Legislature 
expressly intends that these amendments shall be interpreted to apply to any and all conveyances 
by tax deed, past or future." 2016 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 273 § 8 at 758; see Exhibit A at 10. The 
words "shall be interpreted" effectively confirm the legislature's intent that the legislation is not 
made to be retroactive, but instead that the legislature expressly intends this Court to interpret the 
amendments according to the legislature's opinion regarding the intent behind its clarification of 
the law. Id. Fortunately, this is impossible, because the legislature lacks such power. 
Section 1 of Article II of Idaho's Constitution states the separation of powers doctrine: 
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct 
departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or 
collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly 
belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly 
belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly 
or 
10 
does not to 
or a 
to 
to exercise the judicial power. Regan understands the indented paragraph above to stand for the 
proposition that not only may the legislature not exercise the judicial power, but that the legislature 
cannot direct the judiciary in how to exercise that power. Id. 
As stated in the Idaho Schools case, "[t]he legislature shall have no power to deprive the 
judicial department of any power or jurisdiction wl1ich rightly pertains to it as a coordinate 
department of the government .... " Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. State, 
140 Idaho 586, 590, 97 P.3d 453, 457 (2004); citing Idaho Const., Art. V § 13. Regan argues the 
legislature's command to this Court to exercise its power in a particular way would be an 
unconstitutional deprivation by the legislature of this Court's pm:ver. Idaho Const., Art. V § 13. 
Therefore, while it may be helpfal to this Court upon reflection to have the legislature's opinion 
as to whether the new statute is merely a clarification of existing law or retroactive legislation, 
laVvful or not, the fact remains "[b ]oth constitutional questions and questions of statutory 
interpretation are questions of law over which [the Idaho State Supreme] Court exercises free 
review." Stuart, 149 Idaho at 40, 232 P.3d at 818; citing Federated Publ'ns, Inc. v. Idaho Bus. 
Rev., Inc., 146 Idaho 207,210, 192 P.3d 1031, 1034 (2008). 
The third sentence of Senate Bill 1388's Section 8 uses the words "shall be interpreted" to 
command this Court to agree with the legislature when this Court concludes its exercise of its 
judicial power to interpret statutes. 2016 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 273 § 8 at 758; see Exhibit A at 10. 
However, because the legislature has no power to deprive the judiciary of its inherent judicial 
power, it does not appear to Regan and Regan does not argue the legislature may instruct this 
Court on how to exercise its judicial power, in this case the power of statutory interpretation in a 
11 
to the statute. Idaho 
the 
The legislature appears to co1Tuuand this Court precisely how to exercise its judicial power when 
the iegislature uses the word "shall," and Regan believes this Court may and should ignore that 
command and make its ovm interpretation of "these [Senate Bill 1388] amendments." 2016 Idaho 
Sess. Laws, ch. 273 § 8 at 758; see Exhibit A at 10. 
Therefore, the express language of Senate Bill 1388, both in Sections 1 and 8 do not 
indicate the legislature intended the statute to be retroactive in its application to tax deed 
conveyance transactions such that either local government entities or third party purchasers would 
have their then existing property transactions altered, but instead the legislature's intent was to 
command this Court to exercise its interpretive power in a particular way if those transactions ever 
came before the Court. The legislature cannot command this Court how to exercise its judicial 
power, and thus this Court 
the law. 
-· .. ·-···- free to decide whether the legislature intended to merely clarify 
In this case, if the Court agrees Senate Bill 1388 merely clarifies the law it would mean 
"the purpose of Section 63-1009, Idaho Code, has always been to convey title absolutely free and 
clear ofliens and mortgages of a monetary nature[, but that] it was never the intent of the legislature 
to allow a local governmental entity to convey more than the delinquent taxpayer owned and 
thereby to destroy valid property interests held by others." 2016 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 273 § 1 at 
750-51; see Exhibit A at 1. Regan argues Senate Bill 1388 should not be applied retroactively to 
this case, but that this Court may upon reflection interpret the amendatory language according to 
the legislative intent to merely clarify the law. 
12 
not 
s case. 
B. The Enacted Language of Senate Bill 1388 Cannot be Interpreted to be Retroactive. 
\Vhenever two constructions of a statute are possible, and one construction would be 
constitutional and the other unconstitutional, the constitutional construction will be adopted. 
Lawrence v. Defenbach, 23 Idaho 78, 128 P. 81 (1912); see 2 Sutherland on Statutory 
Construction, 2d ed., sec. 641; Bellevue State Bank v. Lilya, 35 Idaho 270, 273, 205 P. 893, 896 
(1922); Griffith v. Owens, 30 Idaho 647,650, 166 P. 922,925 (1917). To interpret Senate Bill 1388 
as requiring a retroactive application would be unconstitutional in Idaho. 
Idaho Code section 67-511 states: 
Vlhere a section or part of a statute is amended, it is not to be considered 
as having been repealed and reenacted in the amended form; but the 
portions which are not altered are to be considered as having been the law 
from the when they were enacted and the new provisions are to be 
considered as having been enacted at the time of the amendment. 
In this case, Idaho Code section 63-1009 was amended by both strikeouts and additions of 
language. 2016 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 273 § 7 at 757-58, see Ex. A, p. 10. Specifically stricken 
was the following italicized language at issue in this case stating the deed conveys "absolute title 
to the land described therein, J,-ee of all encumbrances except mortgages of record .... " Id. The 
italicized language added to section 63-1009 confirms the legislature's intent that "[t]he deed 
conveys to the grantee the right, title, and interest held by the record owner or owners, provided 
that the title conveyed by the deed shall be fi'ee of any recorded purchase contract, mortgage, deed 
of trust, security interest, lien, or lease, so long as notice has been sent to the party in interest .. 
.. " Id. The italicized language in the immediately preceding sentence carries the same language 
found in Idaho Code section 1 as amended in the year 1911, viz., "all right, title, and interest 
13 
tax ceases ,, 
at 1 10 at re: § l 
1 
In 2016, the legislature mirrored the language used in 1911, which both supports the 
legislature's contention that Senate Bill 1388 is merely a clarification of the law, and that the 
legislature recognizes the impossibility of retroactively altering a tax deed conveyance. This is 
especially true for the purposes of this case, where the district court is claimed to have erred by 
one party (Regan), and where in this appeal this Court is being asked to reach a final decision 
regarding that error. 
Section 16 of Article I of the Idaho Constitution states in pertinent part, "No ... law 
impairing the obligation of contracts shall ever be passed." This bar is reiterated and then extended 
in Idaho's Constitution by Section 12 of Article Xl, where it states, "[t]he legislature shall pass no 
law for the benefit of ... any individual, or association of individuals retroactive in its operation, 
or which imposes on the people of any county or municipal subdivision of the state, a new liability 
in respect to transactions or considerations already past." "The obligation of a contract is impaired 
by a statute which alters its terms, by imposing new conditions or dispensing with existing 
conditions, or which adds new duties or releases or lessens any part of the contractual obligation 
or substantially defeats its ends." Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Bashor, 36 Idaho 818, 822, 
214 P. 209,213 (1923). 
Specifically regarding contracts to convey real property by tax deed, "[ w ]here a 
conveyance is made by the county to a third person the transaction rests upon contract which 
cannot be impaired by legislative enactment, the purchaser from the county having acquired a 
vested right." Washington County v. Paradis, 38 Idaho 364, 369, 222 P. 775, 780 (1923); citing 
Beecher v. Board of Supervisors, 50 538 (1879). "[A] county does not acquire a vested right 
14 
property a tax to it a 
a 
at at rights are secure. 
The second part of Section 12 of Article XI of Idaho's Constitution is also very important 
to this case, because local government entities in Idaho may have significant financial liability if 
Senate Bill 1388 is NOT applied retroactively. That Section 12's second part states, "[t]he 
legislature shall pass no law . . which imposes on the people of any county or municipal 
subdivision of the state, a new liability in respect to transactions or considerations already past" 
Idaho Const, Art. XI§ 12. If this Court does not construe Senate Bill 1388 to apply retroactively, 
new liabilities may arise to local public entities that have conveyed tax. deeds for servient estates 
for appurtenant easements. Dominant estate holders of destroyed appurtenant easements would 
likely claim a taking of their real property interest had occurred. Therefore, Section 12 of Article 
XI of Idaho's Constitution bars the legislature from passing a law that would impose on the people 
of a local government entity a new liability in respect to prior conveyances by tax deed. These new 
liabilities may arise related to tax deed transactions that occurred during the four-year period 
preceding this Court's final decision. LC.§ 5-224 (statute oflimitations for inverse condem.11ation). 
"A statute of limitations may bar a constitutional right" Guzman v. Piercy, 15 5 Idaho 928, 
940,318 P.3d 918,930 (2014); see Wadsworth v. Idaho Dep 't ofTransp., 128 Idaho 439,442,915 
P.2d 1, 4 (1996); citing United States v. Didinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947); see also AfcCuskey v. 
Canyon Cnty. Comm'rs, 128 Idaho 213, 215-18, 912 P.2d 100, 102-05 (1996) (holding that an 
inverse condemnation action was barred by the four-year statute oflimitation in LC. § 5-224). 
To preserve the vested rights arising in both a purchaser of a servient estate and the vested 
rights residing in a nearby dominant estate holder when a tax deed sale happens, such a sale must 
be governed by the law in force at the time of sale, and callc11ot be affected by subsequent 
15 
on 
to 
lS 1388 to 
but this Court has the interpretive power to overturn the District Court's error, so that vested rights 
are not destroyed and liability claims against local governmental entities do not arise. 
CONCLUSION 
Senate Bill 1388 was enacted in 2016. Its amendments were expressly made to be "in full 
force and effect on and after its passage and approval," and it was thereafter passed by the 
legislature and approved by the Governor on March 30, 2016. Even if its language could be 
construed to require retroactive application, the legislature lacks the power to command this 
Court to find it thus, and the Idaho Constitution bars such application. This Court should 
conclude the amending language merely serves to clarify, in this case, Idaho Code section 63-
1009, by accounting for legislative intent when it decides this case. 
Respectfully submitted this ___ day ofJune, 2016. 
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LEGISLJl"TURE 
slature 
IN 
STATE OF IDJl"HO 
SeCODd 
SENATE BILL NO. 1388, As J\~rrteDded 
BY STATE AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 
1 AN ACT 
Session - 0 
2 RELJ\.TING TO TAX DEEDS; PROVIDING LEGISLATIVE INTENT; AMENDING SECTION 
3 31-808, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE NONAPPLICATION TO EASEMENTS, HIGHWAYS, 
4 AND RIGHTS-OF-WAY OWNED BY THE COUNTY, UNLESS EXPRESSLY CONVEYED AND TO 
5 JV.LA.KE A TECHNICJl.L CORRECTION; .AMENDING SECTION 43-714A, IDAHO CODE, TO 
6 FURTHER DEFINE THE TERM "PARTY IN INTEREST"; AMENDING SECTION 43-720, 
7 IDAHO CODE, TO REVISE WHAT A TJ\~X DEED CONVEYS; AMENDING SECTION 50-1823, 
8 IDAHO CODE, TO REVISE WHAT A T.A.X DEED CONVEYS; AMENDING SECTION 63-201, 
9 IDAHO CODE, TO FURTHER DEFINE THE TERM "PARTY IN INTEREST" AND TO MAKE 
10 TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS; AMENDING SECTION 63-1009, IDJl"HO CODE, TO REVISE 
11 WHAT A TAX DEED CONVEYS; AND DECLARING AN EMERGENCY AND PROVIDING APPLI-
12 G\.TION. 
13 Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
14 SECTION 1. LEGISLJi.TIVE INTENT. It is the intent of the slature to 
15 clari the scope and effect of Idaho's statutes governing tax deeds. In 
16 the case of Regan v. Owen, the Idaho Supreme Court: addressed whether a tax 
17 deed issued pursuant to Section 63-1009, Idaho Code, has the effect of extin-
18 shing an otherwise valid private easement across the subject property. 
19 Similar slative language exists with respect to counties Section 
20 31-808, Idaho Code, with to irrigation entities in Section 43-720, 
21 Idaho Code, and with re to cities in Section 50-1823, Idaho Code. The 
22 court did not decide the issue, but remanded to a lower court. The lower 
23 court subsequently ruled that, despite the harsh result, the statute has 
24 this effect. While a private access easement was at issue there, the rea-
25 soning would also result in the elimination of public utility easements, 
26 ditch rights, public highways and rights-of-way, conservation easements, 
27 and all manner of third-party rights in the land including, for example, 
28 interests of remainderrnen following a life estate. this legislation, the 
29 Idaho Legislature rejects that conclusion. It was never the intent of the 
30 Legislature to allow local governments to destroy valid property interests 
31 held by third parties in land that is subject to a sale or other conveyance 
32 based on a tax delinquency, except where notice and opportunity to cure is 
33 under the statute. Doing so would constitute an uncompensated 
34 of under both the Idaho Constitution and the United States 
35 Constitution. The slature would never have intended such a result and, 
36 by this legislation, makes that clear. As its context should have made evi-
37 dent, the purpose of Section 63-1009, Idaho Code, and the other referenced 
38 sections, has always been to convey title absolutely free and clear of liens 
39 and mortgages of a monetary nature. It was never the intent of the Legisla-
40 ture to allow a local governmental entity to convey more than the delinquent 
41 taxpayer owned and thereby to destroy valid property interests held by oth-
42 ers wi t:hout notice and an to cure. This clarification the 
43 interpretation of Idaho's tax deed statute into line with the interpretation 
tatutes 
ture' s intent. 
2 
' a 
3 SECTION 2. That Section 31-808, Idaho Code, be, and the same is 
4 amended to read as follows: 
5 31-808. SALE OF COUNTY PROPERTY -- GENE~Zl..L PROCEDURE -- SJ\"LE OF PROP-
6 ERTY ACQUIRED THROUGH TAX DEE;D -- ."'ROCEDURE AFTER ATTEMPTED AUCTION EX-
7 CHANGE OF COUNTY PROPERTY -- SALE OF CERTAIN ODD-LOT PROPERTY -- SALE, EX-
8 CHANGE OR DONATION OF PROPERTY TO OTHER UNITS OF GOVERNMENT. ( 1) A board of 
9 commissioners shall have the power and authority to sell or offer for 
10 sale at public auction any real or personal property belonging to the county 
11 not necessary for its use. :-iowever, personal property not exceeding two hun-
12 dred fifty dollars ($250) in value may be sold at private sale without no-
13 tice or public auction. Prior to offering the property for sale, the board 
14 of county commissioners shall advertise notice of the auction in a newspa-
15 per, as defi::ied in section 60-106, Idaho Code, either published in the county 
16 or having a general circulation in the , not less than ten ( 10) cal-
17 endar days prior to the auction. If the property to be sold is real prop-
18 erty, the notice to be published shall contain the description as well 
19 as the street address of the If the is outside the corpo-
20 rate limits of a and does not have a stree1: address, then the des 
21 shall also contain the distance and direction of the location of the real 
22 from the closest city. 
23 If the to be sold is acquired tax deed, the notice red 
24 to be shed shall include, next to the description of the property, the 
25 of the as it appears tax certificate upon 
26 which the tax deed was issued. The shall be sold to the highest bid-
27 der. However, the board of cormnissioners shall set the minimum bid 
28 for the tax deeded property to include all property taxes owing, interest and 
29 costs but they may reserve the right to reject any a:1d all bids and shall have 
30 discretionary authority to reject or accept any bid which may be made for an 
31 amount less than the total amount of all delinquent taxes, late charges, in-
32 terest and costs, including other costs associated with the property, ad-
33 vertising, and sale, which may have accrued against any property so offered 
34 for sale, including the amount specified in the tax deed to the county. Such 
35 action by the board in setting the minimum bid shall be duly noted in their 
36 minutes. Failure to do so shall not invalidate a sale. For tax deeded prop-
37 erty, the board of county commissioners shall conduct an auction no later 
38 than fourteen ( 14) months from the issuance of the tax deed. 
39 ( 2) (a) Proceeds from the sale of not tax 
40 deed shall be paid into the treasury for the general use of the 
41 cou:-ity. 
42 (b) If the property to be sold has been acquired by tax deed, pursuant 
43 to the provisions of chapter 10, title 63, Idaho Code, the proceeds from 
44 the sale, after payment of all delinquent taxes, late charges, inter-
45 est and costs, including the cost for ma the property, shall 
46 be apportioned by the board of county cornmissioners to parties in inter-
47 est as defi::1ed in section 63-201, Idaho Code, and then to the owner(s) of 
48 
49 
record of such at the time the tax deed was issued on the prop-
(c) 
2 
tax deeded 
shall vJi thin 
3 
3 such sale and the amount of the excess 
4 in interest shall re to the board of county commissioners, within 
5 ( 60) days of receiving such notice, making claim on the proceeds. 
6 No responses postmarked or received after the sixtieth day shall be 
7 accepted. The board of commissioners shall then make payment 
8 to parties in interest in priority of the liens pursuant to law, within 
9 sixty ( 60) days. All funds available after payment to parties in inter-
10 est shall be returned to the owner ( s) of record of the property at the 
11 time the tax deed was issued. All costs associated with the compliance 
12 of this section shall be deducted from any amounts refunded to the par-
13 ties in interest or owner ( s) of record. 
14 (3) Any property sold may be carried on a recorded contract with the 
15 county for a term not to exceed ten (10) years and at an interest rate not to 
16 exceed the rate of interest specified in section 28-22-104 (1), Idaho Code. 
17 The board of county commissioners shall have the authority to cancel any con-
18 tract if the purchaser fails to comply with any of the terms of the contract 
19 shall retain all payments made on the contract. The title to 
20 sold on contract shall be retained in the name of the county 
21 until full payment has been made by the purchaser. However, the purchaser 
22 shall be responsible for payment of all property taxes during the period of 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
the contract. 
( 4) sale of property the 
of the right, title and interest of the 
all delinquent taxes r,;::-,.ich that have 
shall vest in the purchaser al 
county in the property, including 
lien on the property since the 
29 ( 5) In addition to the purchase price, a purchaser of county property, 
30 property acquired tax deed, shall pay all fees required by law 
31 for the transfer of property. No deed for any real estate purchased pursuant 
32 to the provisions of this section shall be delivered to a purchaser until 
33 such deed has been recorded in the county making the sale. 
34 ( 6) Should the county be unable to sell at a public auction any real or 
35 personal property belonging to the county, including property acquired by 
36 tax deed, it may sell the property without further notice by public or 
37 vate sale upon such terms and conditions as the county deems necessary. Dis-
38 tribution of the proceeds of sale shall be as set forth in subsection ( 2) of 
39 this section. 
40 (7) The board of county commissioners may at its discretion, when in the 
41 county's best interest, exchange and do all things necessary to exchange any 
42 of the real property now or hereafter held and owned the coun for real 
43 property of equal value, public or private, to consolidate county real prop-
44 erty or aid the county in the control and management or use of county real 
45 property. 
46 ( 8) The board of county commissioners may, resolution, declare cer-
47 tain parcels of real property as odd-lot property, all or portions of which 
48 are not needed for c purposes and are excess to the needs of the county. 
49 For purposes of this subsection, odd-lot property is defined as that prop-
50 that has an or is a remnant and has value to 
4 
owner. Odd-lot may be 
2 is estimated 
3 licensed to appraise property in the state of Idaho. If, after thirty 
4 days' written notice, an adjoining property owner or owners do not desire to 
5 purchase the odd-lot property, the board of county comrnissioners may sell 
6 the to any other interested party for not less than the appraised 
7 value. When a sale of odd-lot property is agreed to, a public advertisement 
B of the pending sale shall be published in one ( 1) edition of the newspaper as 
9 defined in subsection ( 1) of this section, and the public shall have fif-:een 
10 (15) days to object to the sale i:1 writing. The board of county coITL'nissioners 
11 shall make the final determination regarding the sale of odd-lot property in 
12 an ope:1 meeting. 
13 (9) In addition to any other powers granted law, the board of county 
14 commissioners may at their discretion, grant to or exchange with the federal 
15 government, the state of Idaho, any political subdivision or taxing district 
16 of the state of Idaho or any local historical society which is incorporated 
17 as an Idaho nonprofit corporation which operates primarily in the county or 
18 maintains a museum in the county, with or without compensation, any real or 
19 personal property or any interest in such property owned by the county or 
20 acquired tax deed, after adoption of a resolutio:1 by the board of county 
21 commissioners that the grant or exchange of property is in the public inter-
22 est. Notice of such grant or exchange shall be as provided in subsection 
23 (1) of this section and the decision may be made at any regularly or spe-
24 cially scheduled meeting of the board of county commissioners. The execu-
25 tion and deli very by the county of the deed an interest in the prop-
26 erty shall operate to discharge and cancel all levies, lier-s and taxes made 
27 or created for the benefit of the state, or any other subdi-
28 visio:1 or taxing district and to cancel all titles or claims of title includ-
29 claims of redemption to such real property asserted or existing at che 
30 time of such conveyance. However, if the property conveyed is ect to a 
31 lien for one ( 1) or more unsatisfied special assessments, the lien shall con-
32 tinue until all special assessments have been paid in full. At no time shall 
33 a lien for a special assessment be extinguished to such special assess 
34 ment been paid in full. property conveyed to any local histori-
35 cal society by the county shall revert to the county when the property is no 
36 longer utilized for the purposes for which it was conveyed. 
37 (10) When the county has title to mineral rights severed from the prop-
38 erty to which they attach, and the mineral rights have value of less than 
39 twenty-five dollars ( $25. 00) per acre, the board of county coITL'nissioners may 
40 act to return the mineral rights to the land from which they were severed in 
41 the following manner: the action must appear on the agenda of a reg-
42 ular meeting of the board of county conunissioners; and the motion to make the 
43 return must be adopted unanimously by the board voting in open meeting. 
44 (11) If there are excess funds and the owner (s) of record of the prop-
45 erty at the time the tax deed was issued on the property cannot be located, 
46 then the treasurer shall put all remaining excess funds in an inter-
47 est-bearing trust for three ( 3) years. The county may charge for the actual 
48 costs for performing the search, and after three (3) years, any remaining 
49 funds shall be transferred to the county indigent fund. The levy set to fund 
50 s of the indigent shall be calculated based on the 
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SECTION 3. That Section 43-71 
amended to read as follows: 
Idaho Code, be, and the same is 
43-714A DEFINITIONS. Words a:-id terms used in this , u:-iless the 
context otherwise requires, are defined as follows: 
( 1) "District" means an irrigation district organized u:-ider the provi-
sions of title 43, Idaho Code. 
(2) "Board" means the board of directors of a district. 
( 3) "Treasurer" means the duly appointed officer of an irrigation dis-
trict, and his or her deputies or employees. Such treasurer acts as ex offi-
cio tax collector for the purposes of this chapter. 
( 4) The term "delinquent assessments II as herein used shall be deemed 
and construed to include all general and special assessments and charges for 
operation and maintenance, bond or loan contract payments, or other autho-
rized expenditures, entered in irrigation district assessment rolls, not 
paid when due, and collectible in the manner provided in chapter 7, title 4 3, 
Idaho Code. 
(5) "Facsimile" means the or of a:-i exact copy 
from an document. 
(6) "Party in ir:.terest" means a person partnership, cor-
poration, business venture, or other enti holds a val"d and 
purchase contract, mortgageL BT deed of trust, 
e-::cet:,t-:E-::::-V--:E-e-e-E'"="E:te:::t, _____ in and for the property for which a delinquency 
28 ( 7) "Record owner or owners" means the person or entity in whose name or 
29 names the property stands upon the records in the county recorder's office. 
30 Where the record owners are husband and wife at t:-ie time the notice described 
31 in section 43-717, Idaho Code, shall issue, notice to one ( 1) spouse shall be 
32 deemed and imputed as notice to the other spouse. 
33 (8) "Tax certificate" means a written assignment of a district's right 
34 to a tax deed as provided in section 43-715, Idaho Code. 
35 SECTION 4. That Section 43-720, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 
36 amended to read as follows: 
37 43-720. TAX DEED -- RECITALS -- EFFECT AS EVIDENCE -- TITLE CON-
38 VEYED. The matters recited in the delinquency entry must be recited in the 
39 deed, and such deed duly acknowledged or proved is prima facie evidence that: 
40 ( 1) Benefits were apportioned to the property as required law or wa-
41 ter rights were properly allocated to the property. 
42 ( 2) The assessment was levied in accordance with law. 
43 ( 3) The assessment was equalized as required by law. 
44 (4) The assessment, with statutory penalties, interest and 
45 any other s, was unpaid. 
46 ( 5 J At the proper time the was made as prescribed 
47 law and the proper officer. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
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( 7) The person who executed the tax deed was the proper officer. Such 
deed acknowledged and proved is prima facie evidence of the regular-
ity of all other proceedings for the assessment, inclusive, up to the exe 
cution of the deed. The deed conveys to the grantee the absolute title to 
the lands described therein, free of all encurr,brancesL except ourchase con-
tracts, mortgages, deeds of trust or leases of record to the holders of which 
notice as has not been sent as in this chapter provided, any lien 
for assessments wh"ch that have attached subsequent to the assessment re-
in the issuance of the tax deedL and any lien for state and 
county taxes. For ourposes of this section, the term" encumbrances" does not 
include any easements, highways or rights-of-wav of any tyoe, whether public 
or orivate. 
Any number of of land in the same district may be included 
in one (1) deed where the certificates are held one (1) person, or the dis-
trict. 
SECTION 5. That Section 50-1823, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 
19 amended to read as follows: 
20 50-1823. TP..X DEED -- FORM AND CONTENTS -- TITLE CONVEYED. The matters 
21 recited in the entry must be recited in the deed to the , and 
22 such deed duly acknowledged or shall be prima facie evidence in that: 
23 ( 1) the was assessed as red by law; ( 2) that the was 
24 equalized as required by law; ( 3) that the assessments were levied in accor-
25 dance with law; (4) that the assessments were ; (5) that at the proper 
26 time the delinquency was made as prescribed law and the proper of-
27 ficer; (6) that the property was unredeemed; (7) that the person who executed 
28 the deed was the proper officer of the city. Such deed duly acknowledged and 
29 proved shall be prima facie evidence of the regularity of all proceedings for 
30 the assessments up to and including the execution and deli very of the deed. 
31 The said deed shall convey to the grantee the abssL.:te title "'.:o tl".e lands de 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 SECTION 6. That Section 63-201, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 
39 amended to read as follows: 
40 63-201. DEFINITIONS. As used for property tax purposes in chapters 1 
41 through 23, title 63, Idaho Code, the terms defined in this section shall 
42 have the following meanings, unless the context clearly indicates another 
43 
44 
meaning: 
( 1) "Appraisal" means an estimate of 
45 purposes. 
value for property tax 
1 (a) value to ace the val 1.:e on 
2 any assessment estimation must be made the assessor 
3 or a certified property tax appraiser. 
4 (b) For the purpose of estimating property value to present for an ap-
5 peal filed to sections 63-501A, 63-407 and 63-409, Idaho Code, 
6 the value estimation may be made the assessor, a certified property 
7 tax appraiser, a licensed appraiser, or a certified appraiser or any 
s party as specified by law. 
9 (2) "Bargeline" means those water ion , boats, barges, 
10 lighters and other equipment and property used in conjunctio'.1 with waterways 
11 for bulk transportation of freight or ship assist. 
12 ( 3) "Cogenerators" means facilities which electric en-
13 ergy, and steam or forms of useful energy wt'"' ch 
14 corrunercial, heating or cooling purposes. 
15 ( 4) "Collection costs" are amounts authorized law to be added after 
16 the date of delinquency and collected in the same manner as property tax. 
17 (5) "Credit card" means a card or device, whether known as a credit card 
18 or by any other name, issued under an arrangement pursuar:.t to which a card is-
19 suer ves to a cardholder the privilege of credit from the card 
20 issuer or other person in purchasing or leasing property or services, ob-
21 tai loans, or otherwise. 
22 (6) "Debit card" means any instrument or device, whether known as a 
23 debit card or any other name, issued with or without a fee an issuer for 
24 the use of the cardholder in depos or trans funds. 
25 (7) "Delinquency" means any tax, special assessment, fee, 
26 collection cost, or charge collected in the same manner as property tax, that 
27 has not been in the manner and within the time limits law. 
28 (8) "Electronic funds transfer" means any transfer of funds that is 
29 initiated electronic means, such as an electronic terminal, telephone, 
30 , ATM or magnetic tape. 
31 (9) "Fixtures" means those articles that, al once movable chat-
32 tels, have become accessory to and a part of improve;11.ents to real property 
33 by having been physically incorporated therein or annexed or affixed thereto 
34 in such a manner that removing them would cause material injury or damage to 
35 the real property, the use or purpose of such articles is integral to the use 
36 of the real property to which it is affixed, and a person would reasonably 
37 be considered to intend to make the articles permanent additions to the real 
38 property. "Fixtures" includes systems for the heating, air conditioning, 
39 ventilation, sanitation, lighting and plumbing of such building. 
40 (10) "Floating home" means a floating structure that is designed and 
41 built to be used, or is modified to be used, as a stationary waterborne resi 
42 dential 
43 ( 11) "Improvements" means all buildings, structures, manufactured 
44 homes, as defined in section 39-4105(8), Idaho Code, mobile homes as de-
45 fined in section 39-4105 (9), Idaho Code, and modular buildings, as defined 
46 in section 39-4301 (7), Idaho Code, erected upon or affixed to land, fences, 
47 water ditches constructed for mining, manufacturing or irrigation purposes, 
48 fixtures, and floating homes, whether or not such improvements are owned 
49 separately from the ownership of the land upon or to which the same may be 
50 erected, affixed or attached. The term " " also includes all 
2 
3 ( 12) 
4 quency. 
"Late charge" 
8 
trees vines 
nursery stock. 
means a charge of two percent (2%) of delin-
5 (13) "Lawful money of the United States" means currency and coin of the 
6 United States at par value and checks and drafts ·,,hish that are payable in 
7 dollars of the United States at par value, payable upon demand or present-
8 ment. 
9 ( 14) "Legal tender" means lawful money as defined in subsection ( 13) of 
10 this section. 
11 (15) "Market value" means the amount of United States dollars or equiva-
12 lent for which, in all probabil a property would exchange hands between a 
13 willing seller, under no compulsion to sell, and an informed, capable buyer, 
14 with a reasonable time allowed to consummate the sale, substantiated by a 
15 reasonable down or full cash payment. 
16 (16) "Operating property" means real and personal property operated 
17 in connection with any public utility, railroad or private railcar fleet, 
18 wholly or partly within this state, and which property is necessary to the 
19 maintenance and operation of the public utility, railroad or private rail car 
20 fleet, and the roacs or lines thereof, and includes all rights ac-
21 companied title; roadbeds; tracks; pipelines; bargelines; equipment and 
22 docks; terminals; rolling stock; equipment; power stations; power sites; 
23 lands; reservoirs, generating s, transmission lines, distribution 
24 lines and substations; and all title and interest in such property, as owner, 
25 lessee or otherwise. The term includes electrical generation plants under 
26 construction, whether or not owned by or operated in connection with any 
27 • For the purpose of the appraisal, assessment and taxation of 
28 , pursuant to chapter 4, title 63, Idaho Code, the value of 
29 personal property shall be excluded from the taxable value of op-
30 property in accordance with the provisions of section 63-6021, Idaho 
31 Code, and the value of personal property, other than intangible personal 
32 property, shall be excluded from the taxable value of operating in 
33 accordance with the provisions of section 63-602KK, Idaho Code. 
34 ( 17) "Party in interest II means a person who holds a recorded 
35 purchase contract, mortgage, deed of trustL er security interes 
36 lease upon the property. For purposes of notice requirements in section 
37 63-1009, Idaho Code, recording includes documents recorded in full or by 
38 memorandum orovidina notice thereof. 
39 ( 18) "Person" means any entity, individual, corporation, partnership, 
40 firm, association, limited liability company, limited liability partner-
41 ship or other such entities as recognized the state of Idaho. 
42 (19) "Personal property" means everything that is the subject of owner-
43 ship and that is not included within the term "real property. 11 
44 (20) "Private railcar fleet" means railroad cars or locomotives owned 
45 by, leased to, occupied by or franchised to any person other than a railroad 
46 company operating a line of railroad in Idaho or any company classified as a 
47 railroad by the interstate commerce commission and entitled to possess such 
48 railroad cars and locomotives except those possessed solely for the purpose 
49 of , rehabilitation or remanufacturing of such locomotives or rail-
50 road cars . 
9 
ine es, 
2 tural gas di , or power included within fed-
3 eral law, bargelines, and water companies which are under the urisdiction 
4 of the Idaho public utilities commission. The term also includes telephone 
5 corporations, as that term is defined in section 62-603, Idaho Code, except 
6 as hereinafter provided, whether or not such telephone corporation has been 
7 issued a certificate of convenience and necessity by the Idaho public utili-
8 ties commission. 
9 This term does not include cogenerators, mobile telephone service or 
10 corr.panies, nor does it include pager service or companies, when such 
11 services are an integral of services provided by a certificated utility 
n company, nor does the term "public utility" include s or persons 
13 engaged in the business of providing solely on a resale basis, any telephone 
14 or teleco:m,_'Tlunication service ~ that is purchased from a telephone cor-
15 poration or company. 
16 ( 22) "Railroad" means every kind of railway, whether its line of rails 
17 or tracks be at, above or below the surface of the earth, and without regard 
18 to the kind of power used in moving its rolling stock, and shall be consid-
19 ered to include every kind of street railway, suburban or interur-
20 ban railway excepting facilities established solely for maintenance and re-
21 building of railroad cars or locomotives. 
22 (23) "Real property" means land and all rights and privileges thereto 
23 belonging or any way appertaining, all quarries and fossils in and under the 
24 land, and all other property wtioh the law defines, or the courts may in-
25 terpret, declare and hold to be real property under the letter, spirit, in-
26 tent and meaning of the law, improvements and all standing timber thereon, 
27 including timber owned separately from the of the land 
28 upon which the same may stand, except as modified in 17, title 63, 
29 Idaho Code. Timber, forest, forest land, and forest products shall be de-
30 fined as provided in chapter 1 7, title 63, Idaho Code. 
31 ( 24) "Record owner" means the person or persons in whose name or names 
32 the property stands upon the records of the county recorder's office. Where 
33 the record owners are husband and wife at the time of notice of pending is sue 
34 of tax deed, notice to one ( 1) shall be deemed and imputed as notice to the 
35 other spouse. 
36 (25) "Special assessment" means a charge imposed upon property for a 
37 specific purpose, collected and enforced in the same manner as property 
38 taxes. 
39 (26) "System value" means the market value for assessment purposes of 
40 the operating property when considered as a unit. 
41 ( 27) "Tax code area" means a geographical area made up of one ( 1) or more 
42 taxing districts with one ( 1) total within the geographic area, except 
43 as otherwise provided by law. 
44 ( 28) "Taxing district II means any entity or unit with the statutory au-
45 thori ty to levy a property tax. 
46 (29) "Taxable value" means market value for assessment purposes, less 
47 applicable exemptions or other statutory provisions. 
48 ( 30) "Transient personal property" is personal property, specifically 
49 such construction, logging or mining machinery and equipment which is kept, 
50 , hauled into or for ods of not 
10 
s than (30) , in rno2.:"e -t:han one ( 1) state 
2 the same year. 
3 (31) "Warrant of distraint" means a warrant ordering the seizure of per-
4 sonal to enforce property tax, special assessment, ex-
5 pense, fee, collection cost collected in the same manner as per-
6 sonal property tax. 
7 SECTION 7. That Section 63-1009, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 
8 amended to r:ead as follows: 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
63-1009. EFFECT OF TAX DEED AS CONVEYANCE. The deed conveys to the 
15 or owners, provided that the title conveyed by the deed shall be free of any 
16 recorded purchase contract, mortgaae, deed of trust, securitv interest, 
17 lien, or lease, so long as notice has been sent to the party in interest as 
18 provided in sections 63-201(17) and 63-1005, Idaho Code, and the lien for 
19 property taxes, assessments, charges, interest, and penal ties for which the 
20 lien is foreclosed and in satisfaction of which the property 's sold. 
21 SECTION 8. An emergency exi therefor, which emergency is hereby 
22 declared to exist, this act shall be in full force and effect on and after 
23 its passage and approval. a clarification of exis law, the s-
24 ature does not view the cation of this ame;1dmeDt to or conveyances 
25 as retroactive legislation. In any event, the Legislature expressly in-
26 tends that these amendments shal be to to any and all 
27 conveyances tax deed, or future~ 
